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price competition in previously cartelized manufacturing industries, but it did not 
affect those industries which were not cartelized. The econometric results from a 
comparison of the two groups of industries before and after the introduction of cartel 
law provide strong evidence of a negative effect of collusion on labour productivity 
growth. There is no evidence of any effect of collusion on wages. These results are 
robust to controlling for the potential endogeneity of collusion and are further 
strengthened by a comparison with US data. 
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1. Introduction. 
It is often argued that the lack of competitive pressure may lead to inertia, low worker 
effort and managerial slack, and hence reduce the productivity growth of firms, or that 
it may result in monopoly rents being shared by workers through higher wages. The 
lack of competition may also allow an excessive number of firms to survive in an 
industry, including inefficient firms that would not survive under more competitive 
conditions, and hence further reduce productivity at the industry level. But although 
the view of competition as a stimulus to productivity growth is probably the majority 
position among policy-makers today, the theoretical and empirical support for this 
view has not, at least until recently, been very strong (see Nickell 1999 for a survey). 
This paper provides an econometric analysis of the impact of competition (or 
rather the lack of it) on wages and labour productivity using evidence from a unique 
natural experiment that occurred in the UK in the 1960s. As a result of the 
introduction of the 1956 Restrictive Trade Practices Act, restrictive agreements 
between firms, covering a wide range of industries, were cancelled. This caused an 
intensification of price competition in many industries during the 1960s. These can be 
compared to a control group of industries which had not been subject to agreements 
significantly restricting competition and were not affected by the 1956 Act. A 
comparison of the two groups of industries over a twenty-year period, using data both 
before and after the implementation of the 1956 Act, can provide important insights 
on the links between the intensity of competition, wages and productivity.  
The introduction of cartel legislation in the UK provides us with a way to by-
pass two difficult problems that have been endemic in empirical studies of the effects 
of competition. The first problem is how to measure the intensity of competition. The 
second problem is how to unravel the complex links between competition and other 
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variables, including productivity, given that these variables may simultaneously affect 
one another, thus making the identification of one-way causal effects very difficult.  
The present setup allows us to by-pass these difficulties because a change in 
the intensity of competition across a wide range of industries was induced by an 
exogenous and measurable institutional change. Thus there is no need to measure the 
intensity of competition directly. All that is required is a clear distinction between 
industries that were collusive and were therefore affected by the shift in cartel policy 
and industries that were competitive throughout the period examined. Moreover, the 
intertemporal structure of the data and the exogeneity of the institutional change allow 
us to largely overcome any concerns about potential biases in the estimated impact of 
competition caused by the existence of complex links between competition and other 
variables. Any remaining concerns can be addressed by using information about the 
exogenous industry characteristics facilitating or hindering collusion across British 
industries in the 1950s in the context of a two-stage econometric procedure designed 
to control for the potential endogeneity of collusion. In other words, it is possible to 
address the most common criticism of studies using a difference-in-differences 
methodology, namely the potential endogeneity of the ‘natural experiment’ itself (see, 
for instance, Besley and Case 2000). 
There is a large empirical literature on the effect of competition on wages and 
productivity. Many of these studies have relied mainly on measures of market 
structure and profitability as proxies for the intensity of competition (Nickell 1996; 
Nickell et al. 1994; Hay and Liu 1997; Disney, Haskel and Heden 2003). A potential 
difficulty with this approach is that the links between competition, market structure 
and profitability are complex and ambiguous. For instance, while most people would 
agree that an exogenous increase in industry concentration or a firm's market share 
will soften competition, it is also the case that concentration and market share may 
rise as a result of more intense competitive pressure (Symeonidis 2000a, 2002). 
Furthermore, profitability may fall in the short run but recover in the longer term 
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following an intensification of competition if there is free entry and exit and market 
structure is allowed to adjust (Symeonidis 2002). In other words, there is no simple 
relationship between market structure or profitability variables and the intensity of 
competition, so these variables are rather imperfect proxies for the intensity of 
competition.  
To avoid these complications, some studies have focused on the effects of 
regulatory or economic reform in various countries (for instance, Djankov and 
Murrell 2002; Nicoletti and Scarpetta 2003). Others have examined the effects of 
trade liberalisation policies in developing countries or the EU single market program. 
Such work is particularly useful when significant policy changes are implemented 
within a short period of time, and even more so when firms or industries can be 
classified into groups according to whether they were more or less likely to be 
affected by the policy change – depending, say, on the degree of protection they 
enjoyed prior to the change (Tybout and Westbrook 1995; Bottasso and Sembenelli 
2001; Griffith 2001). Most, but not all, of these studies have found positive effects of 
economic integration or deregulation on productivity, but since these policies often 
involve more than just an intensification of competitive conduct, it may not always be 
easy to draw clear implications for the competition-productivity relationship from 
these results. Schmitz (2005), who by-passes these difficulties by focusing on a very 
specific instance of foreign competition intensification in the US iron ore industry, 
has found a strong effect of competition on productivity. Competitive pressure may 
also intensify as a result of a significant decline in demand. For instance, the collapse 
of the steel market in the 1980s has led to substantial productivity improvements 
among iron-ore producers in several countries (Galdon-Sanchez and Schmitz 2002).  
There have been very few statistical analyses of the links between collusion 
and wages or productivity growth. The only such study for the UK is the one by 
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Broadberry and Crafts (1996).1 They found that productivity growth during 1954-
1963 was slower in industries with restrictive agreements in the 1950s than in 
competitive industries. A potential limitation of the Broadberry and Crafts study 
derives from the use of cross-section data and the fact that they did not examine how 
the two groups of industries evolved after 1963, i.e. after competition intensified in 
those industries which were collusive in the 1950s. As pointed out above, it is 
generally very difficult to unravel the two-way link between competition and 
productivity growth using cross-section analysis. This difficulty can, however, be 
overcome by examining the evolution of the two variables over time – in particular, 
by examining the evolution of productivity across industries both before and after the 
implementation of the 1956 legislation. I carry out this analysis in this paper using a 
comprehensive data set on competition, explicit criteria to classify industries 
according to their competitive status, and a sample that extends over a long time 
period and covers the whole of manufacturing industry. In addition, this paper is, to 
the best of my knowledge, the first one to carry out a statistical analysis of the effect 
of collusion on wages. 
My results provide strong evidence of a substantial negative effect of collusion 
on labour productivity growth. In particular, I find that labour productivity was 
growing much more slowly in collusive industries than in non-collusive industries 
before the implementation of the cartel legislation – after controlling for changes in 
market size, capital intensity, average plant size and differences in technological 
                                                 
1 None of the other existing studies of the effects of cartels and cartel policy in the UK has 
focused on the evolution of wages and productivity. Swann et al. (1973, 1974) conducted a 
series of industry case studies, focusing on the effects of the 1956 legislation on competition. 
The case-study evidence they report to support the hypothesis of a positive effect of the 
breakdown of British cartels on the efficiency of firms is very sketchy. Elliott and Gribbin 
(1977) examined the effect of the 1956 Act on concentration, while O’Brien et al. (1979) 
focused on the impact of the Act on mergers and profitability. Symeonidis (2000a, 2000b, 
2002) provides a detailed econometric analysis of the impact of the 1956 Act on market 
structure, advertising, innovation and profitability, but not on wages and productivity. 
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opportunity across industries. Once the cartels were abolished, however, there was no 
longer any significant difference in the rate of growth of labour productivity between 
the two groups of industries. On the other hand, there is no evidence of any effect of 
collusion on wages of manual or non-manual workers. These results are robust to 
controlling for the potential endogeneity of collusion. I also compare the evolution of 
wages and productivity of UK industries with that of the same industries in the US, 
and I find further evidence for a negative effect of collusion on labour productivity 
growth. 
 
2. The competition data. 
Explicit restrictive agreements between firms were widespread in British industry in 
the mid-1950s: nearly half of manufacturing industry was subject to price-fixing. A 
detailed description of the institutional changes and of the evolution of competition in 
UK manufacturing from the 1950s to the early 1970s can be found in Symeonidis 
(1998, 2002). In what follows I briefly summarise the evidence and describe the 
construction of the competition data for this paper.  
The 1956 Act required the registration of restrictive agreements, including 
verbal or even implied arrangements, on goods. Registered agreements should be 
abandoned, unless they were successfully defended by the parties in the newly created 
Restrictive Practices Court as producing benefits that outweighed the presumed 
detriment or unless they were cleared by the Registrar of Restrictive Trading 
Agreements as not significantly affecting competition. Because the attitude of the 
Court could not be known until the first cases had been heard, the large majority of 
industries registered their agreements rather than dropping or secretly continuing 
them. The first agreements came before the Court in 1959 and were struck down. This 
induced most industries to voluntarily abandon their agreements rather than incur the 
costs of a Court case with little hope of success. Most agreements were cancelled 
between 1959 and 1963. 
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Many agreements provided for minimum or fixed producer prices. In general, 
there were no restrictions on media advertising or R&D expenditure. In some 
industries there was patent pooling or exchange of technical information between the 
parties, but only in one case is there any evidence that these schemes may have 
involved the joint determination of R&D (this industry is not in my sample). Also, 
there were no significant restrictions on entry in most cartelised industries. 
Were the agreements effective? And to what extent did the intensity of price 
competition increase following the abolition of cartels? Case-study evidence (Swann 
et al. 1973, 1974) suggests that in most industries the agreements had been operated 
effectively prior to cancellation, the parties typically accounted for a large fraction of 
the market, and there were a number of factors that limited outside competition in 
many industries. The evidence also indicates that price competition intensified in the 
short run in many industries following the abolition of cartels. However, in several 
cases agreements to exchange information on prices, price changes and so on replaced 
the former restrictive arrangements in the short run, and price competition emerged 
only after these information agreements were abandoned in the mid-1960s, i.e. about 
a decade after the 1956 Act was passed, following adverse decisions of the Restrictive 
Practices Court. In sum, while one cannot rule out cases of ineffective agreements in 
the 1950s or cases of collusion continuing secretly in the 1960s, the available 
evidence suggests that such cases were not numerous. The large majority of industries 
with collusive agreements in the 1950s did experience, sooner or later, an 
intensification of price competition as a result of the 1956 Act, and so it is, on the 
whole, legitimate to think of this evolution as a change of competition regime induced 
by an exogenous institutional change. 
My main source of data on competition were the agreements registered under 
the 1956 Act. A number of other sources were also used to identify unregistered 
agreements or agreements modified before registration, including various Monopolies 
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Commission reports, the Board of Trade annual reports from 1950 to 1956, and 
unpublished background material for the Political and Economic Planning (1957) 
survey of trade associations. All industries in the sample were classified according to 
their state of competition in the 1950s on the basis of three criteria: the reliability of 
the data source; the types of restrictions; and the proportion of an industry's total sales 
covered by products subject to agreements and, for each product, the fraction of the 
UK market covered by cartel firms.  
In particular, the various types of restrictions were classified as significant, not 
significant or uncertain, according to their likely impact on competition. Next, an 
industry was classified as collusive in the 1950s if the products subject to significant 
restrictions accounted for more than 50% of total industry sales. It was classified as 
competitive if the products subject to significant or uncertain restrictions accounted 
for less than 20% of industry sales. And it was classified as ambiguous in all 
remaining cases. Appendix 1 illustrates the classification of industries using particular 
examples.2 All industries with ambiguous state of competition in the 1950s (and a few 
with ambiguous state of competition in the late 1960s and early 1970s) were excluded 
                                                 
2 In fact, out of 55 industries classified as competitive 25 were free from any significant 
restrictive agreements. I have used the 20% cut-off point because in some cases secondary 
industry products were subject to restrictive agreements, although core industry products were 
not. Furthermore, out of 38 industries classified as collusive 20 had agreements covering all 
or nearly all industry products. I have used the 50% cut-off point because in some cases most 
core industry products were subject to price-fixing, although some were not; clearly, one 
would expect a significant impact of the 1956 Act in such cases. The use of a continuous 
competition measure instead of cut-off points has proved impractical for a variety of reasons 
(see Symeonidis 2002 for an extensive discussion). However, small variations in the cut-off 
points (in particular using 10% instead of 20%, or using 40% or 70% instead of 50%) do not 
significantly affect the results reported in section 5. Symeonidis (2002) includes a detailed 
survey of restrictive agreements across all British manufacturing industries. 
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from the basic sample.3  The dummy variable COLL was then defined: this takes the 
value 1 for industries that were collusive in the 1950s and experienced a change in 
competition regime sometime after 1958 and 0 for industries which were competitive 
throughout and therefore experienced no change in regime.  
The panels used in this paper consist of 132 three-digit industries and five 
years: 1954, 1958, 1963, 1968 and 1973.4 Note that, although the Restrictive Trade 
Practices Act was introduced in 1956, it was not until 1959 that industries, on the 
whole, started cancelling their agreements. Moreover, in several industries where 
competition did not break out immediately the Act did not have an impact until well 
into the 1960s. 
 
3. Endogenous variables and descriptive statistics. 
To study the effect of competition on wages and productivity, I estimate in this paper 
reduced-form equations for the determinants of labour productivity, GPPER, the 
average real wage of manual workers, WOP, and the average real wage of non-
manual workers, WOTH, across British manufacturing industries over 1954-1973. In 
particular, GPPER is gross yearly output deflated by industry-specific price indices 
and divided by the average number of employees during the year. WOP is total yearly 
earnings of manual workers deflated by the retail price index and divided by the 
average number of manual workers during the year. And WOTH is total yearly 
                                                 
3 One industry (cement) that remained collusive throughout the period examined in this paper 
was also excluded from the sample to facilitate the interpretation of the results. 
4 The first four of these years are the only ones in the 1950s and 1960s for which comparable 
data on gross output, and hence on productivity, are available. 1973 is the last year before the 
oil crisis of the 1970s. I have excluded from my sample a few industries with significant 
government participation or intervention for part or all of the period under study (sugar, steel, 
aircraft, locomotives). In very few cases two or more three-digit industries were merged into 
one to ensure comparability over time. 
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earnings of non-manual workers deflated by the retail price index and divided by the 
average number of non-manual workers. 
 There are two reasons why I have chosen to focus on labour productivity 
rather than total factor productivity in this paper. First, the data on capital stock are 
estimates rather than primary data, and may therefore be subject to measurement 
error. Even though capital intensity must be included as a regressor in any 
econometric model of labour productivity, the use of labour productivity rather than 
total factor productivity as dependent variable implies that at least there will be no 
measurement error in the dependent variable itself. Second, constructing estimates of 
total factor productivity always involves making rather restrictive assumptions about 
the production function, and these assumptions are not innocuous. The reason for 
using gross rather than net output for my measure of labour productivity is simply that 
there are no reliable data on prices of inputs at the three-digit industry level for the 
period under study in this paper, so it is not possible to use appropriate deflators for 
net output. 
 GPPER, WOP and WOTH are all based on a measure of labour input that is 
not adjusted for hours worked. Data on hours worked during a typical week in any 
given industry and year are available only for manual workers and are often not fully 
comparable with the output data. In addition, data on weeks worked during any given 
year are not available for individual industries. However, to verify that my empirical 
results are not significantly affected by the lack of adjustment for hours worked I also 
constructed a series of labour productivity and wage rate estimates on the basis of the 
available data on hours worked and a number of simplifying assumptions. In 
particular, I assumed that hours worked of non-manual workers were the same as 
those of manual workers, that the number of weeks worked in any given year was the 
same across industries, and I also adjusted some of the figures to ensure comparability 
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across data sources and over time. The results I obtained using my alternative 
measures of productivity and wages were very similar to those reported below.5
Some descriptive statistics on the evolution of labour productivity and real 
wages over 1954-1973 are reported in Table 1. In particular, the table presents 
statistics on the average and median change in each of the three endogenous variables 
of interest over 1954-1958, 1958-1963, 1963-1968 and 1968-1973, separately for 
industries with COLL = 0 (i.e. industries that were competitive throughout the period) 
and industries with COLL = 1 (i.e. industries that were initially collusive but became 
competitive in the 1960s). There is some evidence of a negative effect of collusion on 
productivity. In particular, between 1954 and 1958, a period when the cartels were 
still in place, labour productivity increased two times faster in industries with COLL = 
0 than in industries with COLL = 1 (average change of 9.8% versus 4.9%, median 
change of 9.4% versus 4.5%). On the other hand, between 1968 and 1973, when the 
cartels had generally been abolished, there is only a small difference in the rate of 
productivity growth between the two groups in proportional terms (average change of 
23.5% versus 20%). However, the difference in absolute terms is not much smaller 
than in the 1950s. The statistics for real wages are more ambiguous: between 1954 
                                                 
5 The data on hours worked per week used for these calculations were taken from the Ministry 
of Labour Gazette and its successors, the Employment and Productivity Gazette and the 
Department of Employment Gazette. The data on weeks worked per year were taken from 
O’Mahony and Oulton (1994). Strike activity was not taken into account due to incomplete 
data, but the resulting measurement error in the productivity figures is likely to be small, 
since, even in the most strike-prone industries in my sample, the number of working days lost 
per employee in any given year due to strikes was typically not higher than two in the 1950s 
and 1960s and not higher than four in 1973. Furthermore, there was a tendency for the same 
small group of industries to exhibit intense strike activity over time, so part of the 
measurement error in the productivity figures caused by strikes will be picked up in a panel 
regression by the industry effects. 
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and 1958 the average wage of non-manual workers increased more in industries with 
COLL = 1 than in industries with COLL = 0, while the reverse was the case between 
1968 and 1973. This would be consistent with the hypothesis of a positive effect of 
collusion on wages. However, exactly the opposite pattern can be observed for 
manual workers, whose average wage increased less in industries with COLL = 1 than 
in industries with COLL = 0 between 1954 and 1958, while the reverse was the case 
between 1968 and 1973. Clearly, it is difficult to draw any conclusions on the basis of 
these descriptive statistics, as the comparisons do not control for changes in other 
variables. To unravel any links between competition, wages and productivity, it is 
necessary to turn to the econometric analysis. 
Some potential concerns can nevertheless be addressed on the basis of the 
descriptive statistics alone, before turning to the econometrics. It is well known, and is 
also clear from comparing columns 1 and 4 of Table 1, that productivity growth is 
procyclical. In the present data, there is a strong positive correlation between 
lnGPPER and lnDS, where DS is deflated sales revenue. There is also evidence from 
Table 1 of slow growth across all British manufacturing industries during the period 
1954-1958; in fact the British economy was in a mild recession in 1958. (The figures 
for gross output are very similar to those for sales revenue throughout.) Could it be 
the case that the difference we observe in labour productivity growth between 
collusive and competitive industries during 1954-1958 is due to a difference in 
sales/output growth in the two groups of industries? This could happen if for some 
reason collusive industries in the UK were more sensitive to cyclical fluctuations and 
hence experienced a more significant slowdown in sales/output growth during 1954-
1958 than competitive industries. 
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Table 1 suggests that this is not the case. Sales revenue was growing faster for 
industries with COLL = 0 than for industries with COLL = 1 during most of the period 
examined in this paper. This is not surprising given that the industries with COLL = 0 
tended on the whole to be more advertising-intensive, more R&D-intensive, less 
unionised and less capital-intensive (see Symeonidis 2002, 2003, and Table 5 below), 
and such industries typically experience relatively fast growth. However, the 
difference in the sales growth rate between the two groups of industries was more 
pronounced after the collusive agreements had generally been abandoned (1963-
1973) than in the period when the cartels were in place (1954-1958). In fact, the 
median change in DS was essentially the same during 1954-1958 across the two 
groups (5.5% versus 5.6%), so the period 1954-1958 was the only one when the sales 
growth rate did not differ much across the two groups. In other words, the collusive 
UK industries appear to have been affected less, not more, than the competitive 
industries by the general slowdown in economic growth during 1954-1958, but they 
nevertheless experienced significantly lower labour productivity growth than the 
competitive industries. If the differences in labour productivity growth between the 
two groups of industries were largely driven by cyclical fluctuations, one would 
expect this difference to be (i) very small or non-existent during 1954-1958, and (ii) 
significantly larger in later periods – in other words, exactly the reverse of what we 
observe. Clearly, the figures in Table 1 cannot be explained by cyclical differences 
across industries and/or periods. 
 A second potential concern is that whatever difference we observe in labour 
productivity growth between collusive and competitive industries during 1954-1958 
may not be due to the competitive regime but to some fundamental characteristic that 
differs between the two groups of industries. For instance, collusive industries tended 
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to be more capital-intensive and less advertising-intensive than competitive industries. 
Could it be the case that these or some other industry characteristics rather than 
collusion were the reason for the relatively lower average productivity growth of these 
industries during 1954-1958? This seems unlikely, since it is not then easy to explain 
why the difference in the productivity growth rates is much smaller after 1963 – the 
previously collusive industries did not become less capital-intensive or more 
advertising-intensive after that date. In any case, one can attempt to address this 
concern by comparing the evolution of the two groups of industries in another 
country, such as the US, over the same period: industry characteristics such as relative 
capital intensity or advertising intensity were generally not very different across the 
two countries, while competition laws were. In addition, one can compare the UK 
collusive industries with the same industries in the US, effectively using that group of 
US industries as an alternative control group. US manufacturing industry was largely 
free from collusion during the 1950s, and it is possible, on the whole, to construct 3-
digit US industry definitions that match the UK 3-digit industry definitions by 
aggregating 4-digit industry US data. 
 The data for these comparisons are presented in Table 2. The variables are 
defined in the same way as for Table 1. Let us first compare two groups of US 
industries: those that correspond to UK industries with COLL = 1 and those that 
correspond to UK industries with COLL = 0. Clearly, there are no significant 
differences in the evolution of labour productivity or real wages between the two 
groups during 1954-1958 or in any other period between 1954 and 1973. This implies 
that there are probably no fundamental industry characteristics that may have caused 
one group to have generally higher productivity growth than the other over specific 
periods. Now let us also compare the UK collusive industries with the same group of 
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industries in the US.6 Average and median labour productivity growth for these 
industries in the UK were less than half the US figures during 1954-1958, and they 
were also significantly lower than the US figures during 1958-1963. However, this 
pattern is reversed after 1963 and even more so after 1968, when the UK cartels were 
no longer in place: average and median productivity growth were then higher in the 
previously collusive UK industries than in the same group of industries in the US. It is 
very difficult to think of an explanation for this overall pattern other than a significant 
negative effect of collusion on labour productivity growth. All in all, Table 2 strongly 
suggests that the presence of collusion was indeed the reason for the relatively low 
labour productivity growth of the collusive industries in the UK during 1954-1958 (or 
1954-1963). 
 
4. Econometric model. 
The econometric specifications used in this paper are panel data models with 
individual-specific (industry) effects. My approach is essentially based on the 
difference-in-differences methodology, which consists in comparing the difference 
between the average change in the variable of interest in the experimental group and 
the average change in the same variable in the control group. Time dummies are also 
included among the regressors in an attempt to control for other factors that may have 
influenced the evolution of wages and labour productivity over the period examined, 
such as human capital accumulation, the progressive opening of the British economy, 
the UK government’s prices and incomes policies between 1965 and 1973, and 
                                                 
6 The fact that the number of US industries is slightly smaller than the number of UK 
industries (33 versus 36) does not affect this comparison. For instance, if we exclude the UK 
collusive industries for which there are no comparable US data, the UK figures for average 
ΔlnGPPER become: 4.9 in 1954-1958, 14.5 in 1958-1963, 17.5 in 1963-1968 and 19.5 in 
1968-1973. 
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macroeconomic policy. It is difficult to measure these factors at the industry level, but 
it is plausible to assume that their effect would have been more or less equally 
realised across all industries, or at least that there would not be a systematic difference 
between industries with COLL = 1 and those with COLL = 0 with respect to these 
factors. 
Although I do not attempt to control for the intensification of foreign 
competition caused by the gradual opening of the British economy during the 1960s 
other than by the use of time dummies,7 it is also the case that the extent of foreign 
competition does not seem to have been different in the two groups of industries, i.e. 
the group with COLL = 1 and the one with COLL = 0, during the period examined 
here. As pointed out in Symeonidis (2003) and confirmed in Table 5 below, there is 
no evidence of any difference between the two groups with respect to the intensity of 
foreign competition in the 1950s. Moreover, there is no evidence that changes in the 
intensity of foreign competition were any different between the two groups in the 
1960s. In particular, Kitchin (1976) provides estimates of effective protection for 
1963 and 1968 at a level of aggregation between the two-digit and the three-digit 
industry level. Effective tariff protection increased, according to these figures, in 6 out 
of 12 industries/sectors that I could classify as collusive in the 1950s and decreased in 
the other 6. For industries/sectors that I could classify as competitive throughout the 
                                                 
7 Ideally, one would need some measure of the extent of foreign competition for each industry 
across time. Two possible candidates are the import penetration ratio and the rate of effective 
protection. However, there are serious problems, theoretical and practical, with both of these 
measures. Estimates of effective rates of protection are available at a high level of aggregation 
and only for a few of the years in my sample; also, they are often subject to measurement 
error. The import penetration ratio, on the other hand, is a poor proxy for the extent of foreign 
competition, since it cannot capture the effect of the mere threat of competitive imports, it 
does not take into account imports by domestic producers (which may not be in competition 
with domestic products), and it is itself endogenous. Moreover, the industrial classification 
used in the foreign trade statistics during the period examined here has been subject to 
changes over time and is difficult to match with the one used in the Census of Production. 
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period under study the respective numbers were 8 and 10. Tariff protection changes 
before 1963 were far less pronounced. In summary, it is not unreasonable to argue 
that the estimated effect of collusion from my regressions in this paper is not biased 
by the lack of a better control for the effect of foreign competition. 
My basic specification for labour productivity is   
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and similarly for lnWOP and lnWOTH. DS is industry sales revenue deflated by an 
industry-specific producer price index and serves as a proxy for market size. The idea 
here is that market size may have a positive effect on productivity through static or 
dynamic scale economies or changes in factor utilisation, and a positive effect on 
wages through its effect on labour demand. In fact, we have already seen that labour 
productivity is procyclical in the present dataset.8 K/L is the capital-labour ratio, while 
PLANTSIZE is industry employment divided by the number of plants and is used as a 
measure of average plant size. One reason for including PLANTSIZE among the 
regressors is the idea that the effects of unionisation may be more pronounced in 
                                                 
8 The potential endogeneity of prices may be a cause for concern. However, using the general 
producer price index as a deflator to construct an alternative measure of sales revenue gave 
broadly similar results to those reported here. If there were an endogeneity problem, one 
would expect the two sets of results to differ, and the fact that they don’t suggests that the 
potential endogeneity of prices is probably not a serious problem in the present case. A 
different cause of concern may be the possibility of spurious correlation between DS and 
GPPER. While this is possible, note that DS is included here as a control variable. The 
question of interest is the effect of collusion on GPPER. Controlling for market size is 
preferable to not including DS in the regressions, as this would bias the results if, as seems 
likely, DS is correlated with other exogenous variables. 
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larger plants than in smaller ones (Prais 1981). Y54, Y58, Y68 and Y73 are time 
dummies for 1954, 1958, 1968 and 1973 respectively. AGREE is the percentage of 
employees in any given industry covered by collective bargaining agreements 
(whether national, local or firm-level) in 1973. Any effect of collective bargaining on 
the evolution of wages and productivity should be at least partly captured by the 
interaction terms AGREE*Y54, AGREE*Y58, AGREE*Y68 and AGREE*Y73.9 RD is 
a dummy which takes the value 0 for industries with average or typical R&D-sales 
ratio lower than 2% over 1954-1973 and 1 otherwise. To the extent that the effect of 
innovation on productivity growth over time is more pronounced in R&D-intensive 
industries than in low-R&D industries, it should be at least partly captured by the 
interaction terms RD*Y54, RD*Y58, RD*Y68 and RD*Y73.10 Details on variable 
definition and data sources are provided in Appendix 2. 
The interaction terms COLL*Y54, COLL*Y58, COLL*Y68 and COLL*Y73 
should pick up any differences between industries with COLL = 1 and those with 
COLL = 0 that are due to the different competitive regimes facing the two groups of 
                                                 
9 The year 1973 is the first year for which data on collective bargaining arrangements at the 
three-digit industry level are available. The implicit assumption here is that, although the 
percentage of the workforce covered must have changed over time in any given industry, 
inter-industry differences in coverage probably did not change very much during 1954-1973 
and were primarily determined by exogenous industry characteristics. In preliminary 
regressions I also included among the regressors union density, measured at a level of 
aggregation between the two-digit and the three-digit industry level. Unlike data on collective 
bargaining coverage, union density data are available for the whole period under study, thus 
allowing for an analysis of the effect of changes in union density on the evolution of wages 
and productivity. This variable was nowhere statistically significant; since it was also 
available only at a low level of aggregation, it was dropped from the final specification. 
10 These interaction terms are not endogenous: whether the typical R&D-sales ratio in each 
particular industry will be higher or lower than 2% is determined by exogenous industry 
characteristics (see also footnote 12 below). In contrast, including a measure of innovations as 
a regressor would be problematic because of concerns with potential endogeneity. 
 17
industries. For instance, the coefficient on COLL*Y54 allows for a comparison of the 
evolution of wages and productivity in the two groups of industries between 1954 and 
1963, the coefficient on COLL*Y73 allows for a similar comparison between 1963 
and 1973. The benchmark year is 1963. The choice of 1963 as the benchmark year 
may require some justification in light of the fact that the shift in cartel policy may 
have had some effect in several previously collusive industries before 1963. However, 
preliminary results suggested that a shift in the evolution of labour productivity in the 
group of industries with a change of competition regime occurred around 1963 rather 
than 1958. This is not surprising, given that competition emerged only slowly in many 
of these industries following the implementation of the 1956 Act, and it is also 
consistent with the fact that most of the restructuring of previously collusive 
industries occurred during 1963-1968 (see Symeonidis 2000a, 2002). I have therefore 
chosen to use 1963 as the benchmark year in my econometric specification. 
Note that the above specification is not meant to tell us anything about the 
level of productivity or wages in the two groups of industries in any given year, since 
industry effects are included among the regressors. My difference-in-differences 
approach relies on comparing the evolution of wages and productivity in the two 
groups and indicating what part of the difference is due to the type of competitive 
regime facing firms. Furthermore, this specification is different from most other 
studies of the effect of competition on wages and productivity in that a measure of 
market structure is not included among the regressors. This is because my 
specification is a reduced-form equation and market structure must clearly be 
regarded here as endogenous. In particular, market structure is itself a function of the 
competitive regime: I have shown elsewhere (Symeonidis 2000a, 2002) that the 
intensification of price competition following the abolition of the British cartels 
caused a rise in concentration in previously collusive industries. 
Let me also point out that it is not possible to use a dynamic panel data model 
in the present context. Such an approach would imply ‘losing’ the first one or two 
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periods in the panel, and would therefore amount to eliminating most of the variation 
picked up by the interactions of COLL with the time dummies. Given that the years in 
the panel are separated by periods of four to five years, however, it is not clear why 
there should be any significant effect of lagged values on the endogenous variables in 
my regressions because of adjustment lags or for other reasons. 
A rather more serious objection to the above specification is the potential 
endogeneity of COLL. More specifically, the objection is that whatever difference one 
may observe in the evolution of wages and productivity before or after 1963 between 
industries with COLL = 1 and industries with COLL = 0, after controlling for changes 
in the other explanatory variables, may be to some extent due to unobserved 
characteristics that differ between the two groups of industries rather than to the 
degree of competition. Of course, the fact that the evolution of productivity and wages 
in the two groups is examined here both before and after the effective implementation 
of the cartel legislation constitutes in itself an indirect check of the exogeneity of 
COLL. If, for instance, the two groups were found to be similar after 1963, then it 
would probably be safe to conclude that any observed difference between them before 
1963 was due to collusion. 
To address the potential endogeneity concern more formally, however, one 
needs to instrument COLL. I will therefore also report results from a two-stage 
procedure where COLL is replaced by the estimated probabilities of collusion across 
industries in the 1950s as determined by a first-stage regression of the incidence of 
collusion across industries in the 1950s on a set of exogenous industry characteristics. 
An additional advantage of the two-stage estimates is that they will not be affected by 
any measurement error in my collusion variable due to unidentified or ineffective 
collusive agreements or agreements continuing well into the 1960s. In particular, 
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these estimated probabilities are the fitted values from the following cross-section 
probit regression11:  
iiii
iiiiii
uFOREIGNADVRD
AGREEPLANTSIZELKDSCOLL
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βββ
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where instead of the "propensity to collude" COLL*, an unobserved latent variable, 
we observe the dichotomous variable COLL which takes the value 0 for industries 
without collusive agreements in the mid- and late 1950s and 1 for cartelised 
industries.12 ADV is a dummy variable which is equal to 0 for industries with 
advertising-sales ratio lower than 2% in the mid-1950s and 1 otherwise, and RD is a 
dummy which takes the value 0 for industries with R&D-sales ratio lower than 2% 
and 1 otherwise. These dummies are intended to capture the effect of advertising 
effectiveness and technological opportunity, respectively, on the likelihood of 
collusion.13 FOREIGN is a dummy variable which takes the value 0 for industries 
                                                 
11 Using a linear regression for the first stage estimates produces second-stage results which 
are almost identical to those reported in Table 4. 
12 Five industries which were collusive in the 1950s and had ambiguous state of competition 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s were included in the sample for the probit regression, as was 
one industry that remained collusive throughout the period examined in this paper. 
13 The idea here is that while the advertising-sales ratio and the R&D-sales ratio are 
endogenous, it is generally exogenous industry characteristics that will determine whether 
these ratios are above or below 2%. Thus, for an industry below the 2% cut-off point, 
advertising/R&D is not a very important strategic variable: in such an industry, advertising is 
not very effective in raising consumers’ willingness to pay or there is little scope for 
technological innovation from within the industry. On the other hand, in an industry above the 
2% cut-off point, advertising/R&D "works". Of course, whether such an industry has an 
advertising-sales ratio or R&D-sales ratio of 5% or 10%, say, may be largely determined 
endogenously. But my binary variables ADV and RD are not very sensitive to endogenous 
factors that affect advertising and R&D intensity. The assumption of exogeneity of ADV and 
RD is also consistent with the fact that a comparison of advertising-sales ratios and R&D-
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with relatively high protection in the mid-1950s and the value 1 for industries with 
relatively low protection. It was constructed on the basis of the Kitchin (1976) 
estimates of effective protection rates for 1963 and other available information for the 
1950s. (Tariff protection changes between the mid-1950s and 1963 were not very 
significant.) All the other variables are as previously defined. For DS, K/L and 
PLANTSIZE, I use 1958 data. However, the results turn out to be very similar when 
using 1954 data instead. 
 
5. Results. 
The estimation results for lnGPPER, lnWOTH and lnWOP are presented in Tables 3 
and 4, while the results of the first-stage probit model for COLL are presented in 
Table 5.14 The results in Tables 3 and 4 are for a fixed-effects specification. Robust 
standard errors were derived for Table 3. The standard errors for the two-stage model 
(Table 4) were derived using a bootstrap procedure with 1000 replications. 
Table 3 contains the results from the one-stage regressions, while Table 4 
contains the two-stage results. For the regressions in Table 3, industries with 
ambiguous state of competition in the 1950s or in later years are excluded. In contrast, 
Table 4 makes use of nearly all the industries in the data set, excluding only those 
with ambiguous state of competition in the late 1960s and early 1970s as well as one 
industry that remained collusive throughout.15  
                                                                                                                                            
sales ratios across various years revealed very few instances where an industry had moved 
from below 2% to above 2% or vice versa; and in most cases this was due to an exogenous 
institutional change, namely the introduction of TV advertising in the UK in the mid-1950s. 
14 The results in Table 5 are consistent, on the whole, with those reported in Symeonidis 
(2003), where the determinants of collusion are analysed in greater detail using data at the 
four-digit industry level.  
15 I also ran two-stage regressions using the same sample as in Table 3. The results were very 
similar to those reported in Table 4. 
 21
All the results provide clear evidence of a negative effect of collusion on 
labour productivity growth. The coefficient on COLL*Y54 is positive and statistically 
significant in all regressions with lnGPPER, and it is larger in the two-stage than in 
the one-stage regression results. In particular, the one-stage regression results suggest 
that the net influence of collusion was a six to eight percentage point difference in 
labour productivity growth between non-collusive and collusive industries over the 
period 1954-1963. The two-stage regression results, on the other hand, suggest that 
the influence of collusion was a 20 to 30 percentage point difference in labour 
productivity growth between the two groups of industries over the period 1954-1963, 
and that most of the negative effect of collusion on productivity occurred during 
1954-1958, i.e. before industries started abandoning their restrictive agreements. Note 
that the difference between one-stage and two-stage results is smaller in the 
specification without the interaction terms AGREE*Y54, AGREE*Y58, AGREE*Y68 
and AGREE*Y73.16 After 1963, however, there was no longer any significant 
difference in the rate of growth of labour productivity between the two groups of 
industries: the coefficients on COLL*Y68 and COLL*Y73 are nowhere statistically 
significant at the 5% level. 
To get a better perspective on the magnitude of the effect of collusion on 
labour productivity growth, note the average change in labour productivity in non-
collusive industries during 1954-1963, after controlling for market size, the capital-
labour ratio, average plant size, the interactions of the R&D dummy with the year 
dummies and fixed industry effects. This is given by the coefficient on Y54, using 
1963 as the benchmark: an increase of 11% according to the one-stage results or 16% 
                                                 
16 These terms are not statistically significant in the productivity regressions, and might even 
bias the coefficients on COLL*Y54 and COLL*Y58 to the extent that union power and 
inefficient work practices are one channel through which the lack of competition slows down 
productivity growth (see Schmitz 2005). Dropping the unionisation terms from the wage 
regressions has no significant effect on the coefficients on COLL*Y54 and COLL*Y58. 
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according to the two-stage results. On the other hand, the sum of the coefficient on 
Y54 and the coefficient on COLL*Y54 is a measure of the average change in labour 
productivity in the collusive industries during 1954-1963, again after controlling for 
the same set of explanatory variables. This turns out to be an increase of just 3% 
according to the one-stage results or a decrease of 2% according to the two-stage 
results. By contrast, during 1963-1973 labour productivity increased in both groups of 
industries by about 16%, after controlling for the same set of explanatory variables. 
These results suggest a substantial negative effect of collusion on labour productivity 
growth, even more pronounced than the one suggested by the descriptive statistics in 
Table 1. 
There is no evidence of any effect of collusion on real wages of manual or 
non-manual workers in the present data. One possible explanation is that wages were 
not very sensitive to competitive pressure from the product market during the period 
examined in this paper since they were to a considerable extent determined by 
institutional factors (including centralised bargaining and Wage Council orders) and 
government policy (including incomes policy). This interpretation is supported by the 
fact that the variation in productivity change across industries was much larger than 
the variation in earnings change throughout the period under study – see Table 1 and 
Wragg and Robertson (1978). Another possible interpretation is that, while collusion 
may generally have a positive direct effect on wages, it also reduces productivity 
growth at the industry level, and hence has a negative indirect effect on wages. A 
third possibility is that less efficient firms pay lower wages than more efficient firms 
in any given industry, so when an intensification of competition leads to the exit of 
less efficient firms, the effect on the average industry wage is ambiguous even if the 
wage in each surviving firm has fallen. I should also emphasise that the absence of 
any effect of collusion on wages is not inconsistent with the results from a number of 
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theoretical models of bargaining under oligopoly.17 For instance, Dhillon and Petrakis 
(2002) have shown that, under centralised union-oligopoly bargaining, the wage is 
independent of the degree of market power for fairly general conditions. Under 
decentralised bargaining, on the other hand, the effect of collusion on wages is 
ambiguous because of two opposing effects: on the one hand, collusion increases 
profit margins and hence the ability of unions to push for higher wages; on the other 
hand, collusion reduces output and increases competition between unions for shares in 
employment, and this tends to push wages down (Dowrick 1989). Note that wage 
bargaining in the UK during the period under study was generally a mixture of 
centralised and plant-level bargaining (Ulman 1968). 
An interesting feature of the results in Tables 3 and 4 is the magnitude of the 
coefficients on the year dummies. After controlling for market size, the capital-labour 
ratio, plant size, cross-industry differences in technological opportunity, the effect of 
collusion and industry effects, both labour productivity and real wages were rising 
rapidly during 1963-1973 and possibly also during 1954-1963 as well. To some extent 
this must reflect technological progress and human capital accumulation during this 
period. It may also be partly due to measurement error in the capital-labour ratio, K/L. 
Recall that the capital stock figures are estimates rather than primary data. As K/L was 
increasing across industries throughout the period, it is correlated with the time 
dummies; so to the extent that there is measurement error in K/L, the effect of capital 
intensity could be partly picked up by the time dummies. In any case, even though 
some of the rise in wages and productivity during 1954-1973, and especially during 
1963-1973, seems to have been due to factors not explicitly included in the present 
specification, this does not invalidate the comparison between industries collusive in 
                                                 
17 While these theoretical results have been derived in models with a fixed number of firms, 
the mechanisms driving the results would still operate in a context with endogenous market 
structure. 
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the 1950s and industries competitive throughout the period to the extent that these 
other factors are not correlated with the variable COLL. 
Most of the other explanatory variables in Tables 3 and 4 have the expected 
signs and are usually statistically significant. In particular, there is strong evidence 
that capital intensity increases labour productivity and wages of manual workers 
(although it has no clear effect on the wages of non-manual workers). Market size 
increases both wages and productivity, as expected. An increase in average plant size 
is associated with a fall in productivity and an increase in the wages of manual 
workers, which is consistent with the view that average plant size is positively 
correlated with union power. There is evidence from the one-stage model that an 
increase in the proportion of the workforce covered by collective bargaining 
agreements tends to increase wages; however, the effect is no longer statistically 
significant in the two-stage model. On the other hand, there is little evidence that 
R&D-intensive industries tend to exhibit higher productivity growth. This could be at 
least partly due to the fact that product quality improvements in R&D-intensive 
industries are not adequately captured by the productivity measure used in this paper, 
but it is also consistent with the idea that the effect of innovation on productivity 
works mainly through the use rather than the production of innovations. 
 
6. Concluding remarks. 
The introduction of cartel laws in the UK in the late 1950s caused an intensification of 
price competition in previously collusive manufacturing industries, but it did not 
affect industries which were not collusive. The econometric results from a comparison 
of the two groups of industries provide strong evidence of a negative effect of 
collusion on labour productivity growth. There is no evidence of any effect of 
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collusion on wages. These results are robust to controlling for the potential 
endogeneity of collusion and are further strengthened by a comparison with US data. 
There are several possible mechanisms that could explain the negative effect 
of collusion on labour productivity, but in the absence of firm-level data it is difficult 
to distinguish between these mechanisms. Thus, it is difficult to say to what extent 
productivity improvements under more competitive conditions were brought about 
through larger effort by managers or through the more efficient use of capital or 
labour. One mechanism which does not appear to have played a significant role in the 
present case is innovation, at least innovations produced (as opposed to innovations 
adopted) by firms: I have shown elsewhere (Symeonidis 2002) that the introduction of 
cartel legislation in the UK had no significant effect on the production of innovations 
by firms in previously collusive industries. On the other hand, the significant 
restructuring of these industries through merger and exit (Symeonidis 2000a, 2002) 
must be part of the explanation for the positive effect of competition on labour 
productivity: collusive agreements seem to have allowed inefficient firms to survive 
or maintain significant market shares, and this was no longer possible for many of 
these firms once competition intensified.  
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Table 1. Average change in lnGPPER, lnWOP, lnWOTH and lnDS: 1954-1958, 1958-
1963, 1963-1968 and 1968-1973. 
 
  
ΔlnGPPER 
 
 
ΔlnWOP 
 
ΔlnWOTH 
 
ΔlnDS 
Industries with COLL = 1 
(n = 36) 
 
1954-1958 
 
1958-1963 
 
1963-1968 
 
1968-1973  
 
Industries with COLL = 0 
(n = 52) 
 
1954-1958 
 
1958-1963 
 
1963-1968 
 
1968-1973  
 
 
 
 
 
0.049  [0.045] 
(0.066) 
0.144  [0.147] 
(0.109) 
0.171  [0.186] 
(0.099) 
0.201  [0.188] 
(0.123) 
 
 
 
0.098  [0.094] 
(0.087) 
0.181  [0.163] 
(0.122) 
0.233  [0.221] 
(0.116) 
0.235  [0.231] 
(0.184) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.072  [0.073] 
(0.036) 
0.117  [0.114] 
(0.033) 
0.131  [0.127] 
(0.036) 
0.194  [0.189] 
(0.056) 
 
 
 
0.084  [0.088] 
(0.054) 
0.109  [0.109] 
(0.055) 
0.146  [0.143] 
(0.045) 
0.175  [0.171] 
(0.070) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.048  [0.046] 
(0.066) 
0.101  [0.105] 
(0.040) 
0.091  [0.100] 
(0.053) 
0.123  [0.123] 
(0.072) 
 
 
 
0.032  [0.033] 
(0.077) 
0.096  [0.098] 
(0.054) 
0.111  [0.115] 
(0.057) 
0.130  [0.126] 
(0.070) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.057  [0.055] 
(0.135) 
0.153  [0.128] 
(0.173) 
0.097  [0.096] 
(0.147) 
0.100  [0.139] 
(0.132) 
 
 
 
0.074  [0.056] 
(0.196) 
0.219  [0.206] 
(0.202) 
0.232  [0.209] 
(0.246) 
0.203  [0.172] 
(0.192) 
 
 
Notes: Figures based on industries with available data for all five years. The figures in 
brackets are medians, those in parentheses are standard deviations. n denotes the 
number of industries. 
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Table 2. US industries: Average change in lnGPPER, lnWOP, lnWOTH and lnDS: 
1954-1958, 1958-1963, 1963-1968 and 1968-1973. 
 
  
ΔlnGPPER 
 
 
ΔlnWOP 
 
ΔlnWOTH 
 
ΔlnDS 
US industries corresponding 
to UK industries with COLL 
= 1 (n = 33) 
 
1954-1958 
 
1958-1963 
 
1963-1968 
 
1968-1973  
 
US industries corresponding 
to UK industries with COLL 
= 0 (n = 46) 
 
1954-1958 
 
1958-1963 
 
1963-1968 
 
1968-1973  
 
 
 
 
 
0.117  [0.123] 
(0.085) 
0.195  [0.192] 
(0.099) 
0.144  [0.138] 
(0.066) 
0.143  [0.131] 
(0.113) 
 
 
 
0.129  [0.137] 
(0.092) 
0.181  [0.183] 
(0.116) 
0.142  [0.129] 
(0.080) 
0.161  [0.151] 
(0.127) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.087  [0.093] 
(0.040) 
0.118  [0.114] 
(0.036) 
0.068  [0.060] 
(0.037) 
0.055  [0.062] 
(0.055) 
 
 
 
0.087  [0.083] 
(0.051) 
0.095  [0.105] 
(0.068) 
0.070 [0.063] 
(0.039) 
0.023  [0.039] 
(0.060) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.053  [0.040] 
(0.063) 
0.114  [0.111] 
(0.046) 
0.089  [0.091] 
(0.055) 
0.039  [0.035] 
(0.054) 
 
 
 
0.050  [0.035] 
(0.111) 
0.109  [0.119] 
(0.076) 
0.091  [0.090] 
(0.081) 
0.032  [0.034] 
(0.095) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.076 [0.050] 
(0.146) 
0.188  [0.172] 
(0.139) 
0.246  [0.228] 
(0.158) 
0.178  [0.199] 
(0.155) 
 
 
 
0.116  [0.088] 
(0.210) 
0.239  [0.233] 
(0.180) 
0.264  [0.240] 
(0.184) 
0.144  [0.215] 
(0.258) 
 
 
Notes: Figures based on industries with available data for all five years and that could be 
matched with UK industries. The figures in brackets are medians, those in parentheses 
are standard deviations. n denotes the number of industries. 
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Table 3. Regression results for lnGPPER, lnWOP and lnWOTH: one-stage estimation 
 
 Dep. variable: 
lnGPPER 
 Dep. variable: 
lnWOP 
 Dep. variable: 
lnWOTH 
lnDS 0.406 (12.72)  0.404 (12.78)  0.042 (3.59)  0.039 (2.55) 
lnK/L 0.241 (4.87)  0.243 (4.91)  0.094 (6.32)  0.025 (1.57) 
lnPLANTSIZE −0.188 (−3.87)  −0.187 (−3.90)  0.082 (3.61)  0.047 (1.89) 
Y54 −0.228 (−3.40)  −0.109 (−3.37)  −0.057 (−1.80)  0.082 (1.93) 
Y58 −0.047 (−0.73)  −0.064 (−3.37)  −0.006 (−0.24)  −0.011 (−0.32) 
Y68 0.103 (2.01)  0.084 (3.87)  0.116 (4.51)  0.097 (2.76) 
Y73 0.159 (1.95)  0.155 (4.25)  0.153 (4.15)  0.111 (2.47) 
RD*Y54 −0.044 (−0.74)  −0.038 (−0.64)  0.045 (2.45)  −0.027 (−0.83) 
RD*Y58 −0.028 (−0.57)  −0.030 (−0.64)  −0.012 (−0.64)  −0.015 (−0.65) 
RD*Y68 −0.0001 (−0.00)  −0.001 (−0.03)  −0.006 (−0.37)  0.027 (1.27) 
RD*Y73 0.108 (1.44)  0.108 (1.53)  −0.003 (−0.16)  0.013 (0.69) 
AGREE*Y54 0.171 (1.83)  − −  −0.123 (−2.81)  −0.256 (−4.33) 
AGREE*Y58 −0.024 (−0.27)  − −  −0.098 (−2.78)  −0.095 (−2.17) 
AGREE*Y68 −0.027 (−0.39)  − −  −0.014 (−0.39)  −0.011 (−0.25) 
AGREE*Y73 −0.005 (−0.04)  − −  0.131 (2.63)  0.134 (2.20) 
COLL*Y54 0.060 (2.16)  0.080 (3.20)  0.023 (1.72)  −0.005 (−0.29) 
COLL*Y58 0.033 (1.30)  0.030 (1.42)  −0.001 (−0.03)  −0.004 (−0.32) 
COLL*Y68 −0.007 (−0.29)  −0.010 (−0.46)  −0.005 (−0.50)  −0.009 (−0.74) 
COLL*Y73 0.022 (0.74)  0.021 (0.78)  0.001 (0.03)  −0.032 (−1.83) 
R2 0.91  0.91  0.96  0.91 
Hausman 
statistic 
Prob-value 
105.9 
 
≈0 
 55.7 
 
≈0 
 26.3 
 
0.12 
 58.1 
 
≈0 
No. of 
industries 
No. of 
observations 
93 
 
460 
 93 
 
460 
 93 
 
460 
 93 
 
460 
 
Note: t-statistics based on robust standard errors in parentheses.  
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Table 4. Regression results for lnGPPER, lnWOP and lnWOTH: two-stage estimation 
 
 Dep. variable: 
lnGPPER 
 Dep. variable: 
lnWOP 
 Dep. variable: 
lnWOTH 
lnDS 0.376 (12.52)  0.377 (12.69)  0.054 (4.90)  0.054 (4.13) 
lnK/L 0.235 (5.02)  0.234 (5.08)  0.100 (6.43)  0.017 (1.12) 
lnPLANTSIZE −0.219 (−4.65)  −0.217 (−4.61)  0.083 (3.80)  0.038 (1.65) 
Y54 −0.019 (−0.24)  −0.158 (−4.77)  −0.080 (−1.91)  0.012 (0.19) 
Y58 −0.012 (−0.17)  −0.058 (−2.19)  −0.004 (−0.11)  −0.028 (−0.62) 
Y68 0.153 (2.17)  0.086 (3.20)  0.098 (2.85)  0.097 (1.87) 
Y73 0.285 (3.05)  0.155 (3.95)  0.163 (3.38)  0.093 (1.59) 
RD*Y54 −0.001 (−0.02)  −0.032 (−0.55)  0.023 (0.82)  −0.039 (−1.06) 
RD*Y58 −0.054 (−1.00)  −0.065 (−1.31)  −0.013 (−0.59)  −0.011 (−0.41) 
RD*Y68 0.051 (0.95)  0.036 (0.71)  −0.009 (−0.47)  0.031 (1.22) 
RD*Y73 0.158 (2.10)  0.128 (1.91)  −0.007 (−0.26)  0.012 (0.46) 
AGREE*Y54 −0.250 (−1.87)  − −  −0.090 (−1.13)  −0.140 (−1.24) 
AGREE*Y58 −0.083 (−0.65)  − −  −0.106 (−1.62)  −0.056 (−0.67) 
AGREE*Y68 −0.121 (−0.99)  − −  0.011 (0.18)  −0.025 (−0.27) 
AGREE*Y73 −0.236 (−1.46)  − −  0.092 (1.02)  0.148 (1.41) 
COLL*Y54 0.292 (3.52)  0.186 (3.33)  0.021 (0.40)  −0.042 (−0.65) 
COLL*Y58 0.044 (0.58)  0.009 (0.20)  0.004 (0.13)  −0.026 (−0.53) 
COLL*Y68 0.061 (0.85)  0.010 (0.24)  −0.009 (−0.25)  0.024 (0.47) 
COLL*Y73 0.152 (1.58)  0.050 (1.18)  0.036 (0.67)  −0.004 (−0.06) 
R2 0.90  0.90  0.96  0.90 
Hausman 
statistic 
Prob-value 
348.4 
 
≈0 
 32.5 
 
0.005 
 56.5 
 
≈0 
 47.4 
 
0.0003 
No. of 
industries 
No. of 
observations 
132 
 
650 
 132 
 
650 
 132 
 
650 
 132 
 
650 
 
Note: t-statistics based on bootstrap standard errors in parentheses.  
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Table 5. Regression results for the determinants of COLL. 
 
 lnDS lnK/L lnPLANTSIZE AGREE RD   ADV FOREIGN constant  
Coeff. 0.04 0.17 0.43 2.19 −1.36 −1.32 0.07 −1.57  
 (0.24) (0.84) (1.43) (1.52) (−2.33) (−2.39) (0.24)  (−0.71)  
1 − lnL / lnL0 = 0.21     
No. of observations: 98     
 
Note: t-statistics based on robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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APPENDIX 1: The classification of industries according to their competitive 
status 
 
As pointed out in the text, an industry was classified as collusive in the 1950s if the 
products subject to significant restrictions accounted for more than 50% of total 
industry sales. It was classified as competitive if the products subject to significant or 
uncertain restrictions accounted for less than 20% of industry sales. Small variations 
in the cut-off points do not significantly affect the results. I illustrate here the 
classification of industries in cases where some but not all products within an industry 
were affected by cartels by way of a few examples. A detailed survey of restrictive 
agreements across all British manufacturing industries from the early 1950s to the 
mid-1970s is given in Symeonidis (2002).  
 
Bread and Flour Confectionery (MLH 212) 
The two main products of this industry are bread (about 60% of total industry sales) 
and flour confectionery. The price of bread was under government control until the 
mid-1950s. It then became subject to various agreements by national, regional and 
local associations. The most important agreements were a pricing agreement by the 
Federation of Wholesale and Multiple Bakers, whose members were ‘plant bakers’ in 
England and Wales, and price agreements by the Wholesale and Retail Bakers of 
Scotland Association, the Scottish Association of Master Bakers, and a Joint Costing 
Committee of the two associations, respectively. All these agreements were 
abandoned in 1959-1960. A range of regional agreements in the industry were also 
terminated at that time, as were agreements by various associations of ‘master bakers’ 
and numerous local collusive arrangements. Competition emerged gradually in the 
bread industry, and there was parallel pricing and exchange of information about 
discounts, but the industry was competitive in the 1970s. On the other hand, flour 
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confectionery was not subject to any national agreements. Some of the regional or 
local pricing arrangements among bakers covered flour confectionery as well, but 
most did not. In sum, about 70-80% of MLH 212 was subject to collusion in the 
1950s, hence MLH 212 was classified as a collusive industry in the 1950s. 
 
Carpets (MLH 419) 
There are three subdivisions in this industry: woven carpets, carpeting and carpet 
floor rugs; tufted carpets, carpeting and carpet floor rugs; and other carpets, carpeting 
and carpet floor rugs and pile fabric rugs. A series of agreements by the Federation of 
British Carpet Manufacturers provided for minimum prices for certain types of woven 
carpets, notification of price changes, trade and quantity discounts, conditions of sale 
and resale price maintenance. According to Swann et al. (1973), competition 
intensified after these agreements were abandoned in 1960 despite parallel pricing and 
the exchange of price information. On the other hand, there is no evidence of any 
restrictive agreements in tufted carpets, carpeting and carpet floor rugs. Finally, some 
products that fall into the category “other carpets, carpeting and carpet floor rugs and 
pile fabric rugs” were covered by the agreements of the Federation of British Carpet 
Manufacturers described above. Moreover, a series of registered agreements by the 
Association of Manufacturers of Mohair and Pile Floor Rugs and Mats provided, until 
1961, for specified trade discounts, the maintenance of manufacturers individual 
prices, agreed prices for comparable qualities, and no changes in individual prices 
without prior discussion with other members. The products that were affected by 
collusive agreements in the carpet industry accounted for more than 50% of total 
industry sales, hence MLH 419 was classified as a collusive industry in the 1950s. 
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Scientific and industrial instruments and systems (MLH 354) 
This industry includes a variety of product categories: optical instruments and 
appliances, industrial control systems and equipment, instruments for measuring and 
testing non-electrical magnitudes, instruments for measuring and testing electric 
magnitudes, instruments for physical and chemical analysis, recorders and controllers, 
and instruments not elsewhere specified (including gas and other domestic meters). 
Most of these product categories were entirely free of collusive agreements. However, 
the Meter Manufacturers Association set minimum prices for electricity meters. This 
agreement was formally abandoned in 1960 and was replaced by an information 
agreement, which was apparently successful in reducing competition in the industry 
until about 1970. The Summation Meter Manufacturers Association set minimum 
prices for summation meters until 1965. The prices of various other types of 
instruments for measuring electrical magnitudes were regulated by the ‘subsidiary 
power instrument agreement’ and the ‘patterns group agreement’ until 1958-1960. In 
addition, the Commercial Instruments Conference fixed the prices of certain types of 
ammeters and voltmeters until 1961. Finally, the prices of gas meters were set, until 
1957, by the Gas Meter Makers Conference. The share of all the products affected by 
these agreements in total sales of MLH 354 was less than 10%. Hence MLH 354 was 
classified as a competitive industry. 
 
Footwear (MLH 450) 
This industry includes leather footwear, rubber footwear, and parts of shoes. Leather 
footwear accounts for more than 90% of total industry sales, and there is no evidence 
of collusion in this part of the industry. On the other hand, an agreement of the 
Rubber Footwear Manufacturers Association related to prices charged for rubber 
boots and certain other standardised products, trade discounts, the maintenance of 
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manufacturers’ resale prices, and collective exclusive dealing. This agreement was 
presumably abandoned in 1956, since it was not registered. Also, the Shoe Tip 
Association fixed the prices of heel tips and toe plates until 1961 and a group of 
manufacturers of cut leather soles agreed, until 1959, specified trade discounts and 
aggregated rebates. There is also some evidence of collective exclusive dealing 
arrangements in boot and shoe repairing. But since the primary product of MLH 450, 
covering more than 90% of industry sales, was not subject to collusion, MLH 450 was 
classified as a competitive industry. 
 
 
APPENDIX 2: Data sources and construction of variables 
 
The industry definitions used in this paper are typically at the three-digit level of 
aggregation, i.e. they are the ‘minimum list heading’ (MLH) industries of the UK 
Census of Production. In a few cases, data are available at a more disaggregated level 
and have been used.  
Information on competition was taken from the agreements registered under 
the 1956 Act, the various reports of the Monopolies Commission, the 1955 
Monopolies Commission report on collective discrimination, the 1949 report of the 
Lloyds’ Committee on resale price maintenance, industry studies contained in Burn 
(1958) and Hart et al. (1973), the Board of Trade annual reports from 1950 to 1956, 
and the Political and Economic Planning (1957) survey of trade associations 
(including unpublished background material for this survey). Symeonidis (2002) 
describes the competition data in considerable detail. 
Data on gross output and sales revenue at current net producer prices, wages 
and salaries, and employment were obtained from the industry reports of the Census 
of Production (various years). The figures are for all firms employing at least 25 
persons. No distinction is made between full-time and part-time employees or 
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between men and women. Small corrections were made to some of these figures to 
ensure comparability over time. In addition, some figures were adjusted to correct for 
subsidies and customs and excise duties: subsidies were added to, and customs and 
excise duties subtracted from Census of Production sales and gross output figures. A 
series of retail price indexes was obtained from the Annual Abstract of Statistics. 
Industry-specific producer price indexes were obtained from various sources, 
including the Annual Abstract of Statistics, various issues of the Board of Trade 
Journal and Trade and Industry, the Annual Bulletin of Construction Statistics and 
Business Monitors. Sometimes they were constructed on the basis of data on volume 
of sales often reported, along with data on sales revenue, in the individual industry 
reports of the 1958, 1963 and 1968 Censuses of Production and in Business Monitors. 
Estimates of capital stock, defined as plant and machinery, are available from 
O’Mahony and Oulton (1990) at the three-digit level of aggregation, i.e. for Census 
MLH industries. These are net stock estimates constructed on the assumption of fixed 
and ‘short’ asset lives and exponential depreciation rates. For those few cases where 
gross output and employment data were available at a more disaggregated level, I 
adjusted the O’Mahony and Oulton capital stock estimates on the basis of Census of 
Production data on the fraction of investment on plant and machinery accounted for 
by each ‘principal product’ within any given three-digit MLH industry. A very simple 
adjustment was applied: the three-digit industry capital stock was in each case 
multiplied by the ratio of principal product investment to MLH industry investment, 
averaged over two years. Capital stock was divided by total employment (including 
smaller firms) to construct capital-labour ratios.  
The data for the percentage of employees covered by collective agreements in 
1973 come from the New Earnings Survey of that year. Finally, the procedure for 
constructing RD and ADV was essentially the same as in Symeonidis (2000a, 2000b, 
2002, 2003); see these references for details and a list of the sources used. 
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Finally, US data for Table 2 were taken from three sources. For the years 1958 
to 1973, the data were obtained from the NBER manufacturing productivity database, 
which was constructed by Eric J. Bartelsman and Wayne Gray and is available online 
on the NBER website. For 1954, data on sales, employment and wages were taken 
from the 1954 and 1958 Censuses of Manufactures, while commodity price indexes 
were obtained from the website of the Bureau of Labour Statistics, as was a series of 
the consumer price indexes. Aggregating US 4-digit industries to match the UK 3-
digit industries was relatively straightforward in most cases. In several cases the 
match is not perfect, in the sense that the US aggregate corresponds to a substantial 
part but not the whole of the UK industry. However, there was almost always 
sufficient comparability for my purposes; in a few instances where this was not the 
case, the industries in question were excluded from Table 2. 
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